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Abstract
Economies with oligopolistic markets are prone to ine!cient sunspot
fluctuations triggered by autonomous changes in firms equilibrium conjec-
tures. We show that a well designed taxation-subsidization scheme can
eliminate these fluctuations by coordinating firms in each sector on a single
e!cient equilibrium. At the macroeconomic level, implementing this stabi-
lization policy leads to significant welfare gains, attributable to a quantita-
tively dominant "e!cient stabilization eect". This eect, while important,
is typically ignored in the traditional computations of the welfare costs of
aggregate fluctuations (e.g., Lucas, 2003).
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"The market economy is a social system. In attempting to optimize
her own actions, each agent must attempt to predict the actions of
the other agents. A, in forecasting the market strategy of B, must
forecast B’s forecasts of the forecasts of others including those of A
herself. An entrepreneur is uncertain about the moves of his rivals,
and they of his moves. It is not surprising that this process may
generate uncertainty in outcomes even in the extreme case in which
the fundamentals are non-stochastic." (Shell, "Sunspot Equilibrium",
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2008).
1 Introduction
In this paper, we analyze e!ciency and welfare issues in dynamic economies with
imperfectly competitive product markets. We emphasize the importance of de-
signing appropriate stabilization policies for improving consumer welfare. As is
well known, one typical feature of such economies is that they are likely to exhibit
sunspot-driven fluctuations. This is true in economies where the degree of market
power is su!ciently large that the model dynamics becomes locally indetermi-
nate, as in the canonical RBC model with imperfect competition and increasing
returns analyzed in Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Farmer and Guo (1994).
This is also true when increasing returns to scale are small, if the strategic inter-
actions between firms lead to a multiplicity of equilibrium configurations in each
oligopolistic sector (a situation which we may call strategic indeterminacy). In
this case, as emphasized in Karl Shell’s quotation above, endogenous fluctuations
may emerge as a result of exogenous self-fulfilling changes in firms’ conjectures
on competitors’ actions. Dos Santos Ferreira and Dufourt (2006) introduced such
conjecture changes in an otherwise standard RBC model with oligopolistic mar-
kets and showed that they could generate significant and qualitatively relevant
business cycles.1
Because sunspot-driven fluctuations are usually considered detrimental to risk
averse consumers, several papers, starting with Grandmont (1986) and Reichlin
(1986), have explored the possibility of immunizing the economy from these fluctu-
ations using standard policy tools. In particular, Guo and Lansing (1998) showed
1For an early application of this idea within a simple overlapping generations model, see
Chatterjee et al. (1993).
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that the introduction of a su!ciently progressive income taxation rate can elimi-
nate sunspot equilibria in the Benhabib and Farmer (1994) model.2 The general
idea of the taxation scheme is to distort equilibrium conditions in order to make
the steady state locally determinate. However, taxation schemes which eliminate
dynamic indeterminacy do not necessarily rule out sunspot equilibria implied by
strategic indeterminacy. Indeed, as we will show below, endogenous fluctuations
can occur in this case even if the steady-state is locally determinate.
In this paper, we thus explore the possibility of eliminating sunspot fluctua-
tions linked to the strategic interactions between firms, and we analyze the welfare
eects of implementing such stabilization policies. Building on the general frame-
work developed in Dos Santos Ferreira and Dufourt (2007) to analyze equilibrium
configurations in oligopolistic markets with free entry and exit, we show that there
exist well-designed taxation-subsidization schemes which can achieve this objective
by coordinating firms’ conjectures in each sector on an e!cient equilibrium. The
particular taxation scheme we propose has the feature of distorting payo func-
tions, making unsustainable all equilibrium configurations other than the desired
(e!cient) equilibrium, which is left unaected. Hence, while distortive ex-ante, it
acts ex-post as a pure selection mechanism.
A good policy would then select a desired equilibrium according to some wel-
fare or e!ciency criterion. To gain some insights on the potential welfare gains
that such regulation policies would provide, we develop a simple macroeconomic
model with overlapping generations of consumers and a large number of dieren-
tiated sectors composed of several Cournot competitors. We prove that, in the
laissez-faire economy, the multiplicity of free entry equilibria in any sector is con-
sistent with a large set of aggregate dynamics — influenced by firms’ expectations —,
infinitely many of them involving fluctuating macroeconomic variables. This set of
equilibria is very large and includes, among others, equilibria with smooth fluctua-
tions around a long-run production level, equilibria with endogenous deterministic
cycles, and equilibria with stochastic regime switches. All these trajectories are
associated with variations in the aggregate markup factor — which roughly de-
pends on the aggregate (average) number of firms per sector — and, as such, imply
the existence of a time-varying gap between the e!cient and the realized activity
levels. Our theory is thus consistent with the findings of Chari et al. (2007),
who report that a significant proportion of actual fluctuations are associated with
2See also Christiano and Harrison (1999), and Guo and Lansing (2002).
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time-varying wedges between the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for
leisure and the marginal productivity of labor.
Turning to normative issues, we then compare these potential trajectories in
the laissez-faire economy to those that would be chosen by a benevolent social
planner in first-best and second-best environments. We show that, in each case,
the e!cient trajectory is a stationary deterministic path associated with a well-
determined (fixed) number of active firms per sector. Thus, our framework gives
clear rationale for attempting to stabilize the economy on more stable and ef-
ficient activity levels. The application to all sectors of the particular taxation-
subsidization scheme analyzed at the microeconomic level provides the appropriate
incentives to achieve this objective. We show that implementing this policy would
generate two kinds of welfare gains: first, by reducing the variance of aggregate
fluctuations, it would increase the welfare of risk averse consumers. Second, by
stabilizing the economy on an e!cient (second-best) production level, it would pro-
vide direct e!ciency gains to these consumers. A calibrated version of the model,
in which all aggregate uncertainty results from exogenous stochastic changes in
firms equilibrium conjectures, enables us to quantify these potential gains. In our
benchmark economy, consistent with a variance of aggregate production similar
to those of the US economy, we obtain welfare gains equivalent to a permanent
increase in aggregate consumption ranging between 0.91 and 2.31 percent — an or-
der of magnitude which is approximately 15 times larger than the corresponding
estimates in Lucas (2003). We decompose these gains into a "pure stabilization
eect" and an "e!cient stabilization eect" and show that, from a quantitative
point of view, most of the welfare gains result from the e!cient stabilization ef-
fect. This eect, while potentially important, is typically ignored in the traditional
computations of the welfare costs of aggregate fluctuations.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present
the general concept of free entry equilibrium at the industry level, and examine
how a well-defined taxation scheme can help selecting the desired equilibrium in
the set of potential free entry equilibria. In section 3, we insert this conceptual
framework into a standard overlapping generations general equilibrium model, and
prove that strategic indeterminacy is consistent with a large class of deterministic
and stochastic (endogenous and/or sunspot-driven fluctuations) equilibria. We
characterize the first and second-best activity levels and analyze the trade-os
involved in regulation. In section 4, we use our framework to reconsider the
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traditional issues of stabilization policy and quantification of the welfare costs of
fluctuations. Section 5 concludes.
2 Microeconomics: taxation policy in contestable
markets
In this section, we start by briefly recalling some of the results obtained in Dos
Santos Ferreira and Dufourt (2007), where a general framework was developed in
order to analyze equilibrium configurations within perfectly contestable markets.
Specifically, we show that under Cournot competition and internal economies of
scale (here originating in a non-sunk fixed cost), free entry and exit conditions
are typically consistent with multiplicity of oligopolistic equilibria characterized
by dierent numbers of active firms and dierent individual production levels.
In other words, free entry and exit are not enough to ensure uniqueness of the
equilibrium with zero profits — an equilibrium which in any case is not necessarily
optimal.
We then proceed to show that there exists a taxation-subsidization scheme
which can eliminate all undesired equilibria. The specific scheme that we propose
is required to have two desirable properties: first, to be balanced at the industry
level; second, to select the desired equilibrium without introducing any additional
distortions (which would partially or totally oset the e!ciency gains obtained
from selecting the right equilibrium). This taxation scheme would thus act ex-
post as a pure selection mechanism.
2.1 Cournot free entry equilibria under laissez-faire
Consider, as an example of the general framework developed in Dos Santos Fer-
reira and Dufourt (2007), an industry with a large number Q of identical firms
producing a homogeneous good and competing à la Cournot. The demand to the
industry at price s is e@s, with e A 0. Each firm can produce the homogenous
good with a constant marginal cost f and a positive non-sunk fixed cost f!. The
technology can thus be described by a cost function F such that F (0) = 0 and
F (|) = f (!+ |) for positive output |. Contestability is expressed by the exis-
tence, at any equilibrium, of potential entrants, able to produce the same good
under the same technological conditions as the incumbents, yet obtaining a max-
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imum profit by remaining inactive. The Cournotian price
sW (q) = qq 1f, (1)
equal to the markup factor applied to the marginal cost by any of q active firms,
results from the necessary (and su!cient) first order condition for profit maximiza-
tion by producing firms,3 given their correct conjecture that q1 competitors are
producing |q = e@qsW (q). However, for this price to be an equilibrium price, two
additional conditions must be fulfilled. First, it must be profitable to produce |q
rather than stay inactive, the fixed cost being at least covered by the gross profit.
In other words, the Cournotian price must be at least equal to the break-even price
(the price ensuring zero profit), which is easily obtained as:
s (q) = f
1 qf!@e , (2)
an increasing function of the number q of active firms, of the marginal cost f, and
of the share f!@e of individual fixed cost in aggregate expenditure (which is also
a measure of the degree of increasing returns to scale).
The second condition for the Cournotian price to characterize an equilibrium is
that inactivity be optimal for any potential entrant, given the correct conjecture
that active firms are producing an aggregate quantity q|q, so that a strategy
profile with q firms choosing |q, all others choosing zero, be sustainable. Starting
from the first order condition for profit maximization by a potential entrant (| =p
(e@f)q|qq|q), it is easy to check that the corresponding profit e|@ (| + q|q)
f (| + !) will indeed be non-positive provided q|q is large enough or, equivalently,
provided the Cournotian price sW (q) is small enough, namely not larger than the
limit price
s (q) = f³
1
p
f!@e
´2 . (3)
This price appears to be constant in the number q of active firms, but is again an
increasing function of the marginal cost f and of the share f!@e of individual fixed
cost in aggregate expenditure.
3The first order condition for (interior) maximization of profit e|@
¡
| + \
¢
 f (| + !), under
the conjecture that the competitors’ aggregate supply is \ , can be stated as e\ @
¡
| + \
¢2
= f.
Clearly, this necessary condition is also su!cient, and leads to a symmetric solution, so that the
Cournotian price indeed verifies: ((q 1) @q) s (q) = f.
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Observe that profitability (sW (q)  s (q)) requires, by (1) and (2),
q 
p
e@f!  q. (4)
The upper bound q must be at least equal to 2, in order for an equilibrium to
exist, so that f!@e  1@4 is a necessary condition for existence. Sustainability
(sW (q)  s (q)) in turn requires, by (1) and (3),
q  max
½ q
2 1@q> 2
¾
 q. (5)
A specific equilibrium outcome will thus be associated with any number q of ac-
tive firms in the admissible interval [q> q]. This interval contains more than one
integer as soon as q  4=562, or f!@e  0=048. In this case, the zero-profit equi-
librium, corresponding to the highest integer in the admissible interval, is only
one particular equilibrium among many others. Figure 1 gives an illustration (for
f!@e = 0=04) of this equilibrium indeterminacy, with three equilibrium configura-
tions characterized by 3, 4 and 5 active firms.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium conditions: the Cournotian, break-even and limit price
schedules
2.2 Taxation as a selection device
As long as several strategy profiles are sustainable as equilibrium configurations,
there is no reason to suppose that firms always coordinate on the zero profit
equilibrium, which is the least profitable equilibrium for active firms. There is no
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more reason to believe that the zero profit equilibrium is e!cient. Indeed, if an
increase in the equilibrium number of active firms reduces the distortion introduced
by the markup factor q  q@(q 1), it also generates scale ine!ciencies through
the duplication of the non-sunk fixed cost f! (which is incurred by all active
firms). Clearly, a proper characterization of an e!cient equilibrium would require
the specification of a well-defined selection criterion which should be based on
economic fundamentals, preferences and deep parameters of the model (a point
which will be examined in the next section). In any case, government intervention
may be welcome if it can ensure stabilization on the e!cient equilibrium in the
sector.
There are many ways which can be thought about in order to achieve this
objective. However, distortive taxation appears as the most natural tool. The aim
of the taxation policy would be to distort one or more of the three schedules of
Cournotian, break-even and limit prices so as to make the admissible interval [q> q]
contain at most one integer. While this policy seems attractive, it has a potential
pitfall: if all equilibria are distorted, the e!ciency gains obtained through the
coordination on the best equilibrium might be canceled out by the e!ciency losses
generated by the price distortion. Thus, we would ideally want the taxation policy
to be a strict selection instrument, ensuring coordination on the best equilibrium
but avoiding any distortion or redistribution eects among sectors or among types
of agents (firms and consumers). These conditions can in turn be fulfilled by
imposing several restrictions on the taxation scheme. First, the taxation policy
should be balanced at the sectoral level, the proportional taxes collected from
firms in a sector being entirely redistributed to these firms by lump-sum transfers.
Second, the taxation-subsidization scheme should be "state-dependent" (defined
with respect to the ratio q@qW of the number q of active firms to its target value
qW),4 in order to distort all equilibria except the e!cient one, which should be
left unaected. In other words, the taxation scheme should be inoperative at the
optimal equilibrium, meaning that neither taxes nor subsidies are applied at that
equilibrium. We thus define:
Definition 1 The set of desirable fiscal policies is the set of proportional taxes on
sales at rate  (q@qW) and of lump sum subsidies W (q@qW) to active firms satisfy-
ing:
4Notice that taxation can equivalently be defined as dependent on the ratio (e@q) @ (e@q) =
q@q of the target revenue of the firm to its actual value.
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(i) the sectoral balanced budget (SBB) condition: W (q@qW)q =  (q@qW) e;
(ii) the inoperativeness at the e!cient equilibrium (IEE) condition: W (1) =  (1) =
0.
We can now prove existence of policies satisfying these properties. In order to
take into account taxes and subsidies, we express as follows the profit at state q@qW
of a firm producing | and conjecturing \ as the competitors’ aggregate output:

¡
|> \ > q@qW
¢
=
µ
(1  (q@qW)) e
| + \
 f
¶
|  (f! W (q@qW)) . (6)
The first order condition for maximizing this profit function (together with the
condition \ = (q 1) |) gives the modified Cournotian price
sW (q> qW) = qq 1
f
1  (q@qW) , (7)
a price clearly aected by the proportional sales tax, which augments the marginal
cost by a factor 1@ (1  (q@qW)).
A simple way to achieve the coordination objective is to make unsustainable the
strategy profiles with less than the desired number of active firms, by transforming
fixed costs into variable costs. This can be done by subsidizing any producing
firm through a lump sum transfer W (q@qW) depending on the ratio q@qW of the
actual to the target number of active firms, and by financing this subsidy through
a proportional sales tax at the rate  (q@qW). Similarly, strategy profiles with
more than the desired number of active firms should be made unprofitable by
accomplishing the reverse transformation.
We can accordingly establish two propositions:
Proposition 1 Any free entry equilibrium with q ? qW in the laissez-faire econ-
omy can be ruled out by the choice of a high enough taxation rate  (q@qW) on sales
(redistributed through a lump-sum transfer equal to W (q@qW)).
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 2 Any free entry equilibrium with q A qW in the laissez-faire econ-
omy can be ruled out by the choice of a high enough subsidization rate  (q@qW)
applied to sales (financed by a lump-sum tax equal to W (q@qW)).
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Figure 2: Equilibrium selection through taxation
Proof. See appendix.
The balanced tax-subsidy schemes defined in Propositions 1 and 2 eliminate
all possible equilibrium outcomes under laissez-faire except the e!cient (or the
desired) one, associated with zero taxes and subsidies. Many such schemes can be
designed. Here, we just give the example of the linear a!ne scheme  (q@qW) =
qW (1 q@qW) in order to show, in Figure 2, how the price schedules are distorted
by the taxation policy (relative to the laissez-faire regime) so as to leave one
single possible equilibrium outcome (qW = 5 5 {3> 4> 5} on the top panel, and
qW = 8 5 {6> 7> 8> 9> 10} on the bottom one).
3 Macroeconomics: strategic indeterminacy and
implications
Up to now we have proved that the government could select any particular equi-
librium outcome as its preferred one without referring to an explicit social welfare
criterion. Taking social welfare into account requires to move from partial to gen-
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eral equilibrium analysis, and to provide a complete description of the economy
(preferences, technology, and so on). Accordingly, we now develop a simple macro-
economic model enabling us to derive some important results concerning welfare
analysis and the desirability of adopting policy rules of the type described above.
The model presented in section 3.1 describes a stationary economy with a large
number of sectors producing dierent goods under Cournot competition.
Following our partial equilibrium analysis, the free-entry equilibrium number
of active firms within each sector is indeterminate under laissez-faire and can take
any integer value in some admissible interval [q> q]. Therefore, the realized equi-
librium in each sector will depend on firms’ mutually consistent conjectures about
their rivals’ actions. But there is no reason to believe that the implicit scheme
ensuring this coordination process on a particular equilibrium should remain the
same across sectors and through time. As Shell (2008) emphasizes in the quotation
at the beginning of this paper, it is perfectly conceivable that outcomes of such
strategic games with multiple equilibria may fluctuate randomly, or according to
some extraneous or subjective events unrelated to the economy, even in the ex-
treme case in which the environment is stable and non-stochastic. Accordingly we
prove in section 3.2 that, in accordance with Shell’s predictions, at the intertem-
poral general equilibrium of the economy, solutions to the coordination problem
encompass a large class of admissible dynamic trajectories, infinitely many of them
involving fluctuating aggregate variables.
Facing this fundamental indeterminacy inherent to free entry equilibria, the
government may find profitable to use the taxation policy described above to en-
sure coordination on a particular equilibrium within each sector. We prove in
section 3.3 that this is indeed the case. Compared to the laissez-faire situation, a
well-designed taxation policy can ensure coordination on a second-best intertempo-
ral equilibrium which is welfare improving. The welfare gains are obtained for two
main reasons. First, by ensuring coordination on a particular equilibrium — which
may now remain invariant — the taxation policy can totally eliminate sunspot
driven fluctuations in aggregate variables, improving the welfare of a risk-averse
social planner: this is the pure stabilization eect of the taxation scheme. Second,
by coordinating the economy on a second-best equilibrium, closer in its properties
to the first-best allocation than the laissez-faire economy, the policy can provide
direct e!ciency gains to the social planner: this is the e!cient stabilization eect
of taxation.
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3.1 A simple macroeconomic model
In order to maintain analytical tractability, the model we develop is an overly
simplified dynamic macroeconomic model composed of overlapping generations
of ‘young’ and ‘old’ consumers and of a large number of dierentiated industries
exhibiting identical characteristics.
At each date w, a generation of identical consumers of unit mass is born and lives
for two periods. Consumers work only when young, receiving in this period wage
earnings and dividends from firms (which are equally held by young consumers)
and consume only when old. Young consumers can only save in the form of
money, which bears no interest, and use their money savings when old to pay
for their consumption purchases. We assume that old consumers’ preferences
are defined over goods l = 1> ===>p produced by p industries, with a constant
elasticity of substitution between goods that we take equal to unity. This implies
that consumption may be represented by the aggregate index \ = p
³Qp
l=1 |
1@p
l
´
,
which can be purchased at the corresponding price index S =Qpl=1 s1@pl .
Since equally aged consumers are identical and are identically treated at equi-
librium, we can simply refer to the choices of an aggregate representative young
consumer, born at w and choosing present labor supply Ow and future aggregate
consumption \w+1 in order to maximize expected utility HwX(\w+1)Y (Ow) subject
to the budget constraints Sw+1\w+1 Pw andPw  zwOw+Dw, wherePw is money
demand, zw the nominal wage and Dw the total amount of dividends received from
firms. The first-order condition for this program may be written as
Hw
µ
X 0(\w+1)
zw
Sw+1
¶
= Y 0 (Ow) , (8)
with the two budget constraints binding at the optimum.
For simplicity, we shall restrict our attention to the case of isoelastic sub-
utility functions X (\ ) = \ 13@ (1 ) and Y (O) = yO1+"@ (1 + "), with positive
parameter values and  6= 1. With these assumptions, it is easy to see from the
optimality condition (8) that the young consumer will save in the form of money
all its income available at w, supplying an amount of labor
Ow =
µ
Hw
¡
\ 13w+1
¢ zw
yPw
¶1@"
. (9)
As regards the productive sector, a number Q of potential producers compete
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in each one of the p contestable oligopolistic industries, deciding in particular to
be active or not according to their conjectures about other producers’ decisions
(required to be consistent at equilibrium). The individual production function is
|w = ow  !> where |w is output, ow is labor used in production and ! A 0 is a fixed
(non-sunk) cost. Thus, we consider similar assumptions as in the previous section,
except that in switching from partial to general equilibrium, the parameter f be-
comes an endogenous variable, zw. By contrast, if we assume a constant stock of
money P for all periods and because of the unit elasticity of intersectoral substi-
tution, we may continue to take expenditure per sector as a parameter e =P@p,
corresponding to the money holdings of old consumers divided by the number of
industries.
The condition for output market equilibrium is the equality of aggregate supply
and demand:
\w =
P
Sw
. (10)
Individual sectoral prices are given by Cournotian prices, according to equation
(7), so that the general price index Sw satisfies:
Sw = zw
pY
l=1
µ qlw
qlw  1
1
1  (qlw@qW)
¶1@p
 zw
pY
l=1
1@plw , (11)
where, by symmetry, we have assumed in every industry the same target qW and the
same taxation scheme  (with   0 under laissez-faire and  (1) = 0 generally).
Of course, the optimal target qW will be derived endogenously when considering
the second-best intertemporal allocation.
Equilibrium in the labor market also requires the equality of the correspond-
ing aggregate demand (given by equation (9)) and supply (
Pp
l=1 olw =
Pp
l=1 |lw +
!Ppl=1 qlw, with |lw =P@pzwlw):
³
Hw
¡
\ 13w+1
¢ zw
yP
´1@"
=
P
pzw
pX
l=1
1
lw
+ !
pX
l=1
qlw. (12)
The money market can be ignored since it clears by Walras law when both the
output and the labor markets are in equilibrium.
Combining the market equilibrium conditions (10)—(12), it is easy to show
that the general equilibrium of the economy may be represented by the following
13
non-autonomous one-dimensional dynamic system:
yJw
µJw
Kw
\w + !pqDw
¶"
\w = Hw
¡
\ 13w+1
¢
, (13)
where Jw = pl=1
1@p
lw and Kw = p@
Pp
l=1 (1@lw) are the geometric and arith-
metic markup means, respectively, and qDw = (1@p)
Pp
l=1 qlw is the arithmetic
mean of the numbers of active firms in each sector. Equation (13) is the fun-
damental equation defining the set of admissible dynamic trajectories consistent
with the intertemporal general equilibrium of our economy. Clearly, as noticed
earlier, equilibrium trajectories are strongly influenced by how coordination on a
particular free entry equilibrium is obtained within each sector, through its eects
on the geometric and harmonic markup means and on the total number of active
firms. In the following subsection, we shall consider stationary deterministic and
stochastic trajectories satisfying equation (13) under laissez-faire. The use of regu-
lation through the taxation policy previously described would then rule out all but
the deterministic trajectories by ensuring coordination on a specific equilibrium
configuration within each sector.
3.2 Expectation-driven fluctuations in the laissez-faire econ-
omy
Assume as a starting step that the coordination process selects a time-invariant
number of active firms ql in each sector. Then it is easy to show that equation
(13) has a unique deterministic stationary equilibrium \ obtained by solving the
equation
yJ
µJ
K \ + !pq
D
¶"
\  = 1. (14)
It can easily be verified that if   2, the eigenvalue of the dynamic equation
(13) has a modulus larger than 1 and the deterministic equilibrium \ exhibits the
saddle path stability. In this case, the unique non-explosive equilibrium trajectory
requires that output jump instantaneously and permanently to its unique (but
not necessarily optimal) long-run stationary value \ . The dynamic system is then
said to be determinate in the dynamic sense, since any coordination device that
keeps constant the number of active firms in each industry excludes endogenous
fluctuations. Since we are not interested in this paper in endogenous fluctuations
resulting from dynamic indeterminacy, we shall from now on impose the parameter
14
restriction   2.
However, as noted above, there is no reason to believe that a decentralized
coordination scheme would spontaneously select a time-invariant number of active
firms in each sector. When this is not the case, we shall prove that the set of
admissible dynamics implied by equation (13) includes infinitely many trajectories
with fluctuating aggregate variables.
To be explicit, considerN integers {q1> ===> qN} such that 2  q1 ? === ? qN and
N A 1, and define a state of the economy at time w as a vector Iw = (iw1> ===> iwN)
of proportions of industries that have coordinated in this period on the number qn
of active firms (n = 1> ===>N). Obviously, there are infinitely many such vectors.
A coordination scheme would then describe the set of vectors that are allowed in
each period and also specify the transition process between states across time.
An interesting benchmark consists in assuming that the coordination process
is a simple Markov chain. Specifically, we assume that there is an arbitrary num-
ber U 5 NÂ {0> 1} of possible states, indexed by u = 1> ===> U and character-
ized for each u by the vector of proportions Iu. The transition between states
is governed by a (U×U) row-stochastic matrix T with elements Wlm satisfying
Wlm  Pr(u0 = m | u = l), where a prime stands for next period. It is straightfor-
ward to verify that equation (13) may in this case be reformulated as a system
of U equations (associated with states u = 1> ===> U) characterizing a stationary
stochastic equilibrium:
yJu
µJu
Ku
\u + !pqDu
¶"
\u =
UX
u0=1
Wuu0\ 13u0 , (15)
where the markup means in state u are rewritten as Ju = Nn=1iunn and Ku =
1@PNn=1 (iun@n), with n = qn@ (qn  1), and the corresponding average number
of active firms is also rewritten as qDu =
PN
n=1 iunqn.
Neglecting the profitability and sustainability conditions, existence of a solu-
tion (\1> ===> \U) to this system of equations can be established by a straightforward
application of Brouwer’s fixpoint theorem.
Lemma 1 Assume   2. Let {q1> ===> qN} be any set of integers larger than 1.
Also let the family (I1> ===> IU) of possible states in the economy (a set of U points in
the standard (N  1)-simplex {N31) and the transition matrix T be given. Then
there exists a solution (\1> ===> \U) to the equation system (15).
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Proof. See appendix.
However, for such a solution to be an equilibrium, the profitability and sus-
tainability conditions must also be satisfied, imposing restrictions on the set
{q1> ===> qN} of admissible numbers of active firms (or else on the subset of {N31
which contains the possible states in the economy). Remind that in the partial
equilibrium context of section 2, these numbers were required to belong to some
properly defined interval [q> q]. However, in the present general equilibrium con-
text, this interval ceases to be determined by the sole parameters of the model.
Indeed, according to conditions (4) and (5) in the previous section, q =
p
e@f!
and q = max
np
e@f!@
³
2
p
f!@e
´
> 2
o
, with f now equal to z, an endogenous
variable. More precisely, recalling that
e = Pp =
Su\u
p =
NY
n=1
µ qn
qn  1
¶iun zu\u
p , (16)
we must in fact refer to the conditions (imposed on all states u = 1> ===> U):
qn 
vuut NY
n0=1
µ qn0
qn0  1
¶iun0 \u
!p  qu (17)
for profitability, and
qn 
qu
2 1@qu
 qu (18)
for sustainability. As qu and qu depend on the aggregate output \u, which is also
an equilibrium quantity, these conditions define, for each state r, an admissible
interval [qu> qu], containing the integer numbers qn of active firms for which iun A 0
is allowed in state u, with iun = 0 for all numbers outside the interval. It is
this interdependence which makes far from trivial the task of determining general
conditions for existence of a solution (\1> ===> \U) to the system (15) that also
satisfies the profitability and sustainability conditions at any state u.
Notice however that when there is full symmetry across industries as regards
the number of active firms in each state (Iu belongs to the canonical basis of RN
for any state u) and when the present state is expected to last with probability one
(the transition matrix is the identity matrix), it results from equation (15) that
the conditions (17) and (18) can be stated as n (q)  qn  n (q), where n and n
are state-independent. One can then uniquely define, as in the partial equilibrium
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context, an admissible interval [q> q] depending on the sole parameter values, at
least under a condition stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Consider a set of numbers qn 5 NÂ {0> 1} (n = 1> ===>N), and let
Iu = hu (u = 1> ===> U, with U = N) and T = L. If   (1 ") @3, there exists a
state-independent admissible interval [q> q] such that profitability and sustainability
require qn to belong to that interval.
Proof. See appendix.
Existence of a state-independent admissible interval [q> q], in which the set
{q1> ===> qN} should be included in order to ensure profitability and sustainability
of a solution (\1> ===> \U) to the equation system (15), cannot be established in
general. Thus, it is only after that solution is determined (we know by Lemma
1 that it exists) that we must verify, for each state u, that the interval [qu> qu]
as defined by (17) and (18) contains the set {q1> ===> qN} (or the subset which
corresponds to the non-zero elements of Iu). However, we can find a range of
parameter values for which a state-independent admissible interval can still be
defined, whatever the family of states (I1> ===> IU) and the transition matrix T.
This is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Assume (1 ") @3    2, and take any family of possible
states in the economy (I1> ===> IU) 5 ({N31)U and any transition probabilities
(W1> ===> WU) 5 ({U31)U. Consider the set {q1> ===> qN} of integers introduced in
Lemma 1 and the interval [q> q] referred to in Lemma 2. Then, for
"  1 +
p
1 1@q
q +
1
q 1  [ (q) or "  [ (q) ,
a stationary stochastic equilibrium (\1> ===> \U) exists if the set {q1> ===> qN} is in-
cluded in some admissible state-independent interval [qinf > qsup]  [q> q]. More-
over, [qinf > qsup] = [q> q] if  ? 1 and "  [ (q).
Proof. See appendix.
With non-degenerate transition matrices, if the admissible interval contains
more than one integer, aggregate real output will fluctuate stochastically among
its U potential (generically dierent) values. With degenerate transition matrices,
in particular when all the rows ofT belong to the canonical basis of RU, real output
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will tend to a deterministic cycle of order t  U (possibly after a transition period
of finite time). Clearly, even when there is no extrinsic uncertainty aecting
economic fundamentals, the implicit coordination procedures called for by the
multiplicity of free entry equilibria may be the source of substantial economic
instability.
3.3 Regulation through e!cient coordination
To avoid ine!cient sunspot fluctuations, the government may find desirable to
intervene. An extreme form of regulation would impose optimal production plans
and resource utilization to all agents — a situation which will be referred to as the
first best allocation. Analyzing the first best allocation is important in order to
understand the nature of the distortions involved in a competitive (decentralized)
economy and the trade-os involved in public regulation. However, the first best
allocation requires an extreme form of government intervention which is in many
ways unrealistic or undesirable. A less extreme form of regulation would preserve
market structure and the freedom of firms to set their price, while using taxa-
tion/subsidization schemes in order to aect individual incentives. By selecting
a well-defined taxation scheme (as described in section 2), the government may
then ensure coordination on a (more plausible) second best allocation.
First best allocation. Consider a social planner with utilitarian preferences
over current and future generations:
Z (\1> ===> O0> ===) =
"X
w=0
[X(\w+1) Y (Ow)]13
1  , (19)
where  A 0 may be seen as the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between
generations in the social planner’s preferences or, alternatively, as the degree of
relative risk aversion of the social planner. As  increases, the social planner cares
proportionately more about the welfare of the poorer generations over time, so
that  can also be interpreted as a measure of inequality aversion. In the limit,
when  tends to infinity, the welfare function ends up in the Rawls criterion, with
a social planner only concerned about the utility of the poorest generation.
We define the first best allocation as the solution in (\w+1> Ow> (qlw)l)
"
w=0 to the
maximization5 of welfare Z (\1> ===> O0> ===) under the technological constraint (for
5Strictly speaking, the maximization problem over an infinite horizon is not well defined since
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w = 0> ===>4):
\w  Ow  !
pX
l=1
qlw, with qlw 5 NW for l = 1> ===>p. (20)
A particular feature of the first best allocation is that the social planner can
"choose" the number of active firms in each sector and in each period, avoiding
the di!culties raised by the implicit coordination problem in a competitive equi-
librium. Characterizing the first best allocation is then easy. Since there is no
predetermined variable and the economy is symmetric across periods and sectors,
successive generations confront a time invariant environment. The risk-averse so-
cial planner would thus eliminate sunspot fluctuations by confining the economy to
stationary symmetric trajectories with the same constant number of active firms in
any industry l and any date w. Also, economies of scale resulting from fixed costs
! imply that each industry is a natural monopoly, so that a social planner would
obviously require that output be produced by a single firm in each industry along
an optimal trajectory (qlw = q = 1 for l = 1> ===>p and w = 0> ===>4). Finally, an
optimal stationary trajectory with one active firm per industry must also satisfy
the first-order condition for the representative consumer’s maximization problem,
namely the equality of the marginal utility of consumption \ W and the marginal
disutility of labor OW = \ W + !p
X 0 (\ W) = Y 0 (\ W + !p) (21)
Using the specification for consumers’ preferences, this condition may be writ-
ten as
(\ W)3 = y (\ W + !p)" , (22)
implicitly defining the optimal (stationary) output \ W.
To sum up, in a first best solution the social planner would fully exploit increas-
ing returns to scale by allocating all the production activity to a single productive
firm in each industry. Naturally, the social planner would also want to eliminate
it concerns an undiscounted series. Following von Weizsäcker (1965) and Gale (1967), we should
more properly refer to the choice of a sequence (\w+1> Ow> (qlw)l)
4
w=0 that overtakes all the other
feasible sequences, meaning a sequence that at some point of time "has provided more utility
than the other[s] and [...] continues to do so from that point on" (Gale, 1967, p.3). Applying
this criterion is however trivial in the present context of an invariant environment.
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any market power distortion resulting from this monopoly position. Hence, the
first best solution can be implemented in a market economy only if the regulatory
agency is capable of imposing marginal cost pricing to monopolistic firms, while
subsidizing them to cover their fixed costs.
Second best allocation. By contrast, we define a second best allocation as an
allocation preserving market structure and the freedom of firms to set their price,
but resulting from the capacity of the government to commit to a predetermined
(optimal) taxation/subsidization scheme that ensures coordination on a particular
equilibrium at each date and in each sector.
Compared to the first best allocation, the intervention possibilities of the gov-
ernment are limited in two dimensions. First, in a competitive economy char-
acterized by free entry in each sector, the government can only select (through
appropriate taxation) a number of active firms in each sector which belongs to
the admissible interval [q> q], defined according to Lemma 2. Second, the so-
cial planner must take into account, in addition to the technology constraints
|lw  olw  !qlw, the three additional incentive compatibility and market equilib-
rium constraints (10)—(12) leading to the dynamic system (13). Formally, the
second best allocation is obtained as the solution in ((|lw> olw> qlw)l)
"
w=0 to the max-
imization of welfare Z (\1> ===> O0> ===), with \w = ppl=1|
1@p
lw and Ow =
Pp
l=1 olw,
under the constraints (for w = 0> ===>4):
|lw  olw  !qlw, with qlw 5 (NÂ {0> 1}) _ [q> q] for l = 1> ===>p,
yJw
µJw
Kw
\w + !pqDw
¶"
\w = \ 13w+1 , (23)
where qDw = (1@p)
Pp
l=1 qlw, Jw = pl=1
1@p
lw and Kw = p@
Pp
l=1 (1@lw) (with
lw = qlw@ (qlw  1)).
Notice that in this problem the coordination process in each sector is no longer
ensured by the exogenous transition matrix T. By committing to a predetermined
taxation/subsidization scheme for any sector and any date, the government can
make the dynamic equilibrium path deterministic. Characterizing the second best
allocation is then simple. As in the former case, the strict concavity of the social
planner’s utility function implies that stationary paths are preferred to fluctuating
paths. Along a symmetric stationary trajectory with qlw = q for all industries and
all dates, the second best aggregate production level \ (q) is then determined by
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the welfare maximizing value of q 5 [q> q] along a stationary path, i.e. the one
satisfying the optimality condition
X 0 (\ (q)) = qq 1Y
0 (\ (q) +pq!) (24)
Comparing (24) to (21), we see that the social planner faces two sources of
ine!ciencies in the second-best environment: (i) a market power distortion, re-
flected by the term q@(q  1) in (24), which reduces labor supply compared to
the first-best allocation ; (ii) a scale ine!ciency eect, which results from the
duplication of the fixed cost of production as the number of competitors in each
sector increases. Obviously, the first distortion is decreasing in q while the sec-
ond one is increasing in q> so that there is a trade-o involved in regulation. We
cannot tell in general which of the two eects is going to dominate, but it is clear
that the relative shapes of the functions X (·) and Y (·) of the representative con-
sumer’s preferences are crucial in the arbitrage. Using the specific functional form
retained, the optimality condition (24) becomes:
\ (q)3 = qq 1y (\ (q) + !pq)
" (25)
and the problem of the social planner, equivalent to maximizing in the number q
of active firms the utility of the representative agent of a representative generation
along a stationary path:
U (\ (q) > q) = \ (q)
13
1   y
(\ (q) + !pq)1+"
1 + " (26)
can be written as, using (25),
U (\ (q) > q) = \ (q)
13
1  
¡
(1 1@q)\ (q)3
¢1+1@"
y1@" (1 + ") = (27)
From inspection of (26) and (27), it is clear that labor supply elasticity (as
measure by 1@") plays a dominant role. Equation (26) shows that, for any
level of production \ (q) > an increase in " increases the disutility of labor, mak-
ing the utility cost of the scale ine!ciency eect higher. Meanwhile, equation
(27) shows that, as " increases, labor supply becomes less and less sensitive
to the real wage and, thus, to the market power distortion eect. It is then
clear that when labor supply is relatively inelastic (i.e., for large "0v) welfare
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Figure 3: Utility of the representative agent in a symmetric economy with q
active firms per sector.
is unambiguously maximized at the smallest integer in the admissible interval
[q> q]. By contrast, when " is small, the market power distortion eect be-
comes significant. So, when the labor supply elasticity is high, there is a real
trade-o involved. For instance, in the limit case of a perfectly elastic labor
supply (" = 0) we obtain, by (25) and (26), \ (q) = ((1 1@q) @y)1@ and
U (\ (q) > q) = \ (q)13 @ (1 )  y (\ (q) + !pq). Aggregate production is
increasing in q> but utility U (\ (·) > ·) is strictly quasi-concave.6 Depending on
whether the value eq maximizing U (\ (·) > ·) on the unconstrained interval [2>4)
is outside or in the interior of the admissible interval [q> q] > the representative
young consumer’s utility U may have a maximum either at the lowest, the largest
or an interior integer of this interval= Figure 3 illustrates the latter two possibili-
ties when labor supply is elastic> using the following calibration: " = 0>  = 0=4,
! = 0=2 and  = 0=38 (case (a)) or  = 0=44 (case (b)).
4 Welfare gains of stabilization
The generic existence of sunspot-driven fluctuations in economies with imperfectly
competitive markets also sheds new light on the traditional issues of stabilization
policy and of the welfare costs of fluctuations. Since the well-known paper by Lu-
cas (2003), it is often argued that the benefits from reducing further the variability
6We easily obtain:
gU (\ (q) > q)
gq = y
Ã
(q 1)1@2
y1@q1+1@  !p
!
,
a decreasing function of q, tending to y!p as q tends to 4. Hence, U (\ (·) > ·) is strictly
quasi-concave and eventually decreasing.
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of aggregate consumption are very small, typically of an order of magnitude which
is less than a tenth of a percent of total consumption. In addition, stabilization (or
equivalently, in the present model, the reduction of inequality among generations)
is often seen as conflicting with e!ciency since the main instrument of redistrib-
ution – distortive taxation – is believed to generate an ine!cient reallocation
of resources. In this section, we show that, in the present context of strategic
indeterminacy, these two objectives, far from being conflicting, are instead com-
plementary. Because stabilization can be obtained together with e!ciency gains,
it could lead to substantial welfare gains. We use our framework to quantify these
potential gains. We decompose these gains into two easily interpretable compo-
nents: a "pure stabilization eect", which merely captures the eect of a reduction
in the variance of consumption for stochastic consumption streams of given mean,
and an "e!cient stabilization eect" which measures the eects associated with
an e!cient reorganization of production activities. In line with Lucas (2003), we
show that the welfare gains resulting from the pure stabilization eect are very
small. However, the e!cient stabilization eect leads to sizeable welfare gains that
are quantified below.
Before going further we shall mention at this point that, while the present
framework of overlapping generations had the obvious advantage of enabling us to
derive clearcut and rigorous existence results on stationary equilibria influenced
by sunspots, it is not the best suited to analyze the welfare gains of stabilization
from a shorter-run perspective. This is particularly true because our model has
no accumulable asset which could be used to "self-insure" against earnings risk.
However, we believe that this framework remains useful, at least as a first approx-
imation, to illustrate the potentially significant welfare gains that can be obtained
from applying the proposed economic policy.7 While, strictly speaking, the para-
meter  in the social welfare function is a natural measure of the social planner’s
aversion toward inequality between generations, it could also be considered as
a standard measure of relative risk aversion of an infinitely-lived representative
agent maximizing intertemporal utility, as in standard business cycle models. Un-
7Actually, we have also pursued the alternative strategy of considering a standard infinitely-
lived representative agent framework with capital accumulation similar in spirit to the model
developed in Dos Santos Ferreira and Dufourt (2006). Experimenting with this framework, we
obtained quantitatively similar results, but were not able to derive formal proofs for generic
existence of stationary equilibria (as in Lemma 1-2 and proposition 3), although existence of
such equilibria was verified numerically for standard calibrations of parameters and transition
matrices.
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der both interpretations, as  increases, the social planner dislikes more and more
fluctuations in aggregate consumption paths with identical means.
4.1 Calibration
In order to get some magnitude about the welfare gains obtained by applying
the proposed stabilization policy, we need to find a calibration for the structural
parameters and for the states and transition matrices that generate a realistic
stochastic process for aggregate output. The number p of sectors is only a scale
parameter, and we arbitrarily set it top = 1= Following Hansen (1985), we assume
an infinitely elastic aggregate labor supply by setting " = 0= We know from the
last section that with this assumption, sectoral output is increasing in the number
of producing firms in each sector but welfare may be maximized for any integer
in the admissible interval [q> q]> depending on the values of the other structural
parameters. We chose a calibration for > y and ! that ensures that the admissible
interval for the number of active firms in each sector always includes [3> 5] (in each
state), while the optimal number of active firms per sector is interior and equal
to qW = 4. There are some degrees of freedom in this choice, but the quantitative
results are only marginally aected. A reasonable calibration accomplishing this
task is y = 0=4, ! = 0=2 and  = 0=44. This is the configuration illustrated
in Figure 3(b). With this calibration, output increases from 3.19 to 4.83 as q
increases from 3 to 5 firms per sector, but the optimal level of aggregate output,
obtained when the number of active firms per sector is equal to qW = 4 in each
sector, is \ W = 4=17 =
Amore di!cult task in the calibration step consists in specifying the states and
transition probabilities adequately. In order to achieve this step, we adapted the
numerical procedure described in Tauchen (1986) so as to obtain a set of states
(I1> ===> IU) 5 ({N31)U and transition probabilities (W1> ===> WU) 5 ({U31)U that
generate a simulated path for the log of aggregate output that mimics as closely
as possible a standard AR(1) process, while the number of active firms in each
sector and each state u = 1> ===> U remains in the corresponding admissible interval
[qu> qu]  [3> 5] = The number of states U can be chosen arbitrarily, but precision
is of course increased for larger U’s. In our simulations, we found that imposing
U = 7 dierent states was su!cient to obtain a reasonable approximation.
Using annual US data for the period 1947-2010, the log of real aggregate out-
put about a linear trend is reasonably well approximated by an AR(1) process
24
with autoregressive parameter * = 0=90 and standard deviation % = 0=023= In
our benchmark scenario, we thus computed the states and transition matrix so
that simulated aggregate production mimics an identical AR(1) process around
a mean value which we set at \ = 4=17> the same aggregate production level as
in the second-best economy. The following matrix I (containing the vectors of
proportions of sectors producing with q = 3> 4 and 5 firms, respectively, in each
state) and transition matrix W accomplish this task, for u = 1> ===> 7:
I =
5
9999999999997
=47 =30 =23
=38 =32 =30
=30 =34 =36
=23 =35 =42
=16 =34 =50
=10 =32 =58
=04 =24 =72
6
::::::::::::8
W =
5
9999999999997
=59 =32 =08 =01 0 0 0
=22 =41 =29 =07 =01 0 0
=04 =21 =42 =27 =06 0 0
0 0=05 =24 =42 =24 =05 0
0 0 =06 =27 =42 =21 =04
0 0 =01 =07 =29 =41 =22
0 0 0 =01 =08 =32 =59
6
::::::::::::8
.
Thus, for example, when the current state is u = 4> there are 23% of sectors
which produce with 3 active firms, 35% of them producing with 4 active firms, and
42% of them with 5 active firms. The probability of remaining in the same state for
the next period is 42%, while the probability of moving to, e.g., state u0 = 5 is 24%.
With this specification, as noticed, the long run production level is \ = \4 = 4=17=
The long run average number of firms per sector is qD4 = (=23> =35> =42) · (3> 4> 5) =
4=19, the long run markup factor is J = 1=33 and the long run degree of increasing
returns to scale, as measured by x = (\ +qD!p)@\ 1, is 0=20.8 Table 1 provides
these summary statistics for each state u = 1> ===> 7:
4.2 Welfare gains
We simulated W = 10000 times the Markov process described above, and computed
the social planner’s welfare fZW PWw=1 ¡[X(\w+1) Y (Ow)]13 @(1 )¢ over this
horizon. Then, following Lucas’ approach, we calculated the proportion f of
8Note that, in this model, increasing returns to scale appear under the weak form of fixed
costs in production. Aggregate increasing returns to scale of about 20% are consistent with
the findings of Burnside et al. (1997) when they take the form of fixed costs. Markup rates
of 33% are typically in the upper range of available empirical estimates. Note however that,
in this literature, markup rates are typically obtained as a by-product of the estimated degree
of aggregate increasing returns to scale, imposing the zero profit assumption. Relaxing this
assumption would have led these studies to conclude to significantly larger estimated markups.
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Table 1 - Aggregate data for the simulated economy
States: u = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
\u 3.86 3.96 4.07 4.17 4.28 4.39 4.51
qDu 3.75 3.91 4.05 4.19 4.33 4.48 4.67
Ju 1.39 1.37 1.35 1.33 1.32 1.30 1.28
xu .20 .20 .20 .20 .20 .20 .21
permanent consumption that the social planner would be willing to sacrifice in
each period in order to get rid o aggregate uncertainty and have the economy
stabilized around an aggregate production level \ , i.e. the value of f for whichfZW =PWw=0 ³£X((1 f)\ ) Y (O)¤13 @(1 )´. We provide this coe!cient for
two hypothetical configurations. In the first situation, we assume that output is
stabilized on the median state u = 4> corresponding to a situation in which output
is stabilized by "freezing" permanently the equilibrium configuration prevailing
in each sector. In the second situation, we assume that output is stabilized e!-
ciently by imposing that each sector produces with qW = 4 active firms (e.g., by
imposing the proposed taxation scheme). The first experiment enables us to com-
pute the welfare gains resulting from the "pure stabilization" eect, i.e. the eect
of removing consumption uncertainty without improving average e!ciency in the
economy. The second experiment enables us to estimate the total stabilization
eect, including the eect of stabilizing the economy e!ciently together with the
pure stabilization eect. Results from these experiments are given in Table 2, for
dierent values of the risk aversion parameter .
As Table 2 shows, the benefits implied by the "pure stabilization" eect are
very small and in line with those obtained in Lucas (2003). For example, when
 = 1, aggregate fluctuations generate a cost for the social planner which is equiv-
alent to a permanent reduction of its consumption level of about one seventeenth
of a percent (f = 0=06). However, the welfare gains resulting from the total sta-
bilization eect (including that of the e!cient reorganization of production) are
much more significant, with f now equal to 0=93. This means that the same social
planner would now be willing to sacrifice almost 1 percent of its consumption level
in each period in order to have the economy stabilized on the e!cient production
level – 15=5 times as much as in the first configuration. As the relative risk aver-
sion of the social planner increases, the ratio of the total to the pure stabilization
eects increases, but it remains equal to more than 3=5 at  = 10.
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Table 2 – Welfare gains (f, in percent of consumption)
 = 1  = 2  = 4  = 10
Stabilization on median state
(pure stabilization eect) 0.06 0.09 0.15 0.34
Stabilization on qW= 4
(total stabilization eect) 0.93 0.96 1.02 1.21
Benchmark economy Y(4) = Y
W
4.3 Understanding the welfare gains
How can we explain this sharp discrepancy between our results and those ob-
tained by Lucas (2003), while preferences are similar and the variance of aggre-
gate consumption is approximately the same? Clearly, the dierence comes from
the e!cient stabilization eect. To get a better sense of this eect, notice that
when the economy is stabilized on the median state u = 4 (pure stabilization,) the
aggregate production level \4 = \ W = 4=17 is reached while several sectors pro-
duce at a suboptimal individual scale of production (23% of sectors produce with
3 active firms, and 42% of them produce with 5 active firms). At the aggregate
level, this ine!ciency can be seen by observing that this production level \ W is ob-
tained with an average number of active firms, qD4 = (=23> =35> =42) · (3> 4> 5) = 4=19,
which is larger than the optimal number of firms per sector, qW = 4. Thus,
the aggregate quantity of labor required to produce \ W in the median state is
also larger than the corresponding quantity of labor in the second-best economy:
O4 = (J4 @K4 )\ W + qD4p! A OW = \ W + qWp!. Following Lucas (2003), we can
then quantify this ine!ciency cost in utility equivalents for the social planner.
For example, the utility cost of having the economy stabilized on the median state
u = 4 (rather than on the second-best equilibrium) can be measured by calcu-
lating the additional quantity of labor, expressed in percentage points of labor,
required to produce the same aggregate production level \4 = \ W. This amounts
to compute the parameter O such that eU(\ W> O4) = eU(\ W> (1 + O)OW), where OW
is the e!cient quantity of labor. By additivity (eU(\> O) = \ 13@(1  )  O),
we simply obtain:
1 + O =
O4
OW =
(J4 @K4 )\ W + qD4p!
\ W + qWp! .
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Using p = 1, ! = 0=2, \ W = 4=17 and I4 = (=23> =35> =42) in state 4, we easily
compute O = 0=0091, a utility cost equivalent to a 0=91 percent permanent in-
crease in aggregate labor supply. To make this measure more directly comparable
to the one obtained in Lucas (2003), we can easily translate this cost in terms of
consumption equivalents using the formula eU(\ W> (1+O)OW) = eU((1F)\ W> OW).
With our specification for preferences and " = 0, we then obtain
F = 1
(\ W13  y(1 )O (\ W + qW!))
1
13
\ W ,
a number which is equal to F = 0=0087 for the calibration considered. Thus,
looking at Table 2 and considering for example the case  = 1, our results indicate
that the welfare gains resulting from the "pure stabilization eect" are equiva-
lent to a 0.06 percent permanent increase in consumption while the welfare gains
resulting from the "e!cient stabilization eect" amount to a 0.87 percent such
increase. We obtain in total f = 0=06 + 0=87 = 0=93, which is consistent with the
numerical findings reported in Table 2.
As a final remark, observe that these results were obtained while assuming
that the economy was fluctuating around a mean value for output which was
identical to the second-best optimal value \ W = 4=17. This assumption was made
for simplicity, but it should be clear that it only provides a lower bound on the size
of welfare gains that are obtained from the e!cient stabilization eect. To see this,
consider for example an alternative economy in which output fluctuates according
to the same AR(1) process (with identical autoregressive coe!cient and variance)
but around a mean value which is now 12% lower than the e!cient output level
(\4 = 3=67 ? \ W = 4=17). This situation can be obtained, keeping the same
transition matrix W , by using the following matrix I 0 of vectors of proportions of
sectors producing with 3, 4 or 5 active firms in each state u = 1> ===> 7:
I 0=
5
9999999999997
=85 =10 =05
=74 =17 =09
=65 =23 =12
=57 =26 =17
=49 =29 =22
=41 =32 =27
=32 =32 =35
6
::::::::::::8
The welfare gains obtained in this situation are reported in Table 3. As the
28
Table 3 – Welfare gains (f, in percent of consumption)
 = 1  = 2  = 4  = 10
Stabilization on median state
(pure stabilization eect) 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.27
Stabilization on qW= 4
(total stabilization eect) 2.08 2.10 2.15 2.31
Alternative economy: Y(4) ? YW
table shows, the welfare gains corresponding to the pure stabilization eect are still
very small and are actually smaller than in the reference economy (for example,
f = 0=02 when  = 1, as opposed to 0=06 in the reference economy)= However, the
gains resulting from the e!cient stabilization eect are nowmuch larger, exceeding
2 percent of permanent increase in average consumption.
5 Concluding remarks
We have explored strategic indeterminacy, arising in the context of oligopolistic
competition, as a convenient alternative to dynamic indeterminacy in generating
macroeconomic sunspot fluctuations. The case for this alternative is here pre-
sented in a very basic framework, that of standard Cournot competition with free
entry in the presence of fixed costs (as concerns microeconomics), and of a simple
overlapping generations macro model. Since strategic indeterminacy is shown to
be the source of costly sunspot fluctuations, a straightforward way of stabilizing
the economy is to ensure determinacy by destroying undesirable, ine!cient, equi-
libria. This is achieved, in the present context, by converting fixed into variable
costs (or vice versa) through a taxation-subsidization policy which happens to be
inactive, hence non distortive, in the only remaining equilibrium. Corresponding
policies, acting as pure selection mechanisms designed to stabilize the economy at
the e!cient equilibrium, might also apply in other contexts of strategic indeter-
minacy. Finally, we have quantified the welfare gains of this stabilization policy
in a calibrated version of our model, fitting US data. These gains appear to be
much larger than those estimated by Lucas (2003) on the basis of a pure stabi-
lization eect benefiting risk averse consumers. The dierence between Lucas’s
estimation and our own results can be entirely ascribed to e!cient stabilization,
that is, to elimination of ine!cient states — an eect that would be praised even
29
by risk neutral consumers.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Taking the expression for profit (6), making it equal to zero and referring
to symmetric profiles with | = |q = \ @ (q 1), we see that the corresponding
break-even price is
s (q> qW) = f
1  (q@qW) (f! W (q@qW))q@e , (28)
which, taking condition (SBB) into account, simplifies to
s (q> qW) = f
1 qf!@e . (29)
When the government balances its budget at the sectoral level, this price is thus left
unaected by the taxation policy, in contrast to the Cournotian price given by (7).
By using the first order condition for maximization in | of  (|> q|q> (q+ 1) @qW)
by a potential entrant, and making the corresponding (interior) maximum equal
to zero, we may easily compute the limit price
s (q> qW) = f³p
1  ((q+ 1) @qW)
p
(f! W ((q+ 1) @qW)) @e
´2 (30)
or, taking (SBB) into account,
s (q> qW) = f³p
1  ((q+ 1) @qW)
p
f!@e  ((q+ 1) @qW) @ (q+ 1)
´2 , (31)
a price which is also aected by the taxation policy.
It is now easy to verify that an equilibrium with q ? qW active firms can always
be made unsustainable by the choice of a high enough taxation rate. Indeed, take
for any q@qW ? 1 the boundary value  (q@qW) = qf!@e = q@q2 which, by condition
(SBB), leads to a complete subsidization of the fixed cost (W (q@qW) = f!). The
unsustainability condition s (q> qW) ? sW (q> qW) for q ? qW 1 then translates into
2q ? q2, an inequality which is always satisfied, since 2  q ? qW  q. For
q = qW  1, as  ((q+ 1) @qW) = 0, the unsustainability condition is equivalent to
(1 q@q)2 A 0, which again is always satisfied.
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Proof of Proposition 2
The expressions for the Cournotian, break-even and limit prices are the same
as before, even if the taxation rate  is now negative. From (29) and (7), together
with condition (SBB), it is easy to see that the condition sW (q> bq) ? s (q> bq) is
fulfilled for any high enough rate of subsidy on sales:
 (bq) A 1 q2f!@eq 1 = 1 (q@q)2q 1 . (32)
However, we must also check that the equilibrium associated with qW subsists.
The profitability condition under laissez-faire is not modified, since  (0) = 0.
By contrast, sustainability requires the Cournotian price sW (qW> 0) to be at most
equal to the modified limit price s (qW> 0) given by (31). If we replace the subsidy
 (1) by its upper lower bound in (32) with q = qW + 1, the sustainability
condition can be easily shown to be always (strictly) satisfied.
Proof of Lemma 1
Take the u-th equation of the system (15). Given the set of possible num-
bers of active firms {q1> ===> qN} (with 2  q1 ? === ? qN) and the u-th state
Iu = (iu1> ===> iuN) of the economy together with the corresponding transition prob-
ability vector (Wu1> ===> WuU), the output value \u at this state can be determined
as a function u of the output values (\1> ===> \U) at all the states of the econ-
omy (through the weighted arithmetic mean on the RHS of the equation). For
consistency, we must of course look for a fixed point of the continuous mapping
 = (1> ===> U). Existence of such a fixed point results from Brouwer’s theorem,
provided we can establish that  maps some non-empty set
£
\ > \
¤U
into itself.
First consider the case  ? 1. Since \ 13 is then increasing in \ , \ 13 PU
u0=1 Wuu0\ 13u0  \
13
for any (\1> ===> \U) 5
£
\ > \
¤U
, any T and any u. Given
{q1> ===> qN}, the means Ju and Ku are functions of Iu, and their ratio is a
continuous function defined on the compact set {N31, which has a maximum
maxIM{N31
¡
J (I ) @K (I )
¢
= b A 1 and a minimum
minIM{N31
¡
J (I ) @K (I )
¢
= 1. As q1  qn  qN and qN@ (qN  1) 
qn@ (qn  1)  q1@ (q1  1) for any n, and as the LHS of any equation in (15)
is increasing in \ , we may choose the values \ and \ that solve, respectively, the
equations
y q1q1  1
(b\ + !pqN)" \ = \ 13 and y qNqN  1 ¡\ + !pq1¢" \ = \ 13. (33)
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Indeed, for any (\1> ===> \U) 5
£
\ > \
¤U
and any u, \ ? u (\1> ===> \U) ? \ , as
required. Notice that \ is always smaller than \ , so that
£
\ > \
¤U
is non-empty
(and non-degenerate).
We use the same kind of argument for  A 1 but, as \ 13 is now decreasing
in \ , we take the values \ and \ that solve simultaneously the equations:
y q1q1  1
(b\ + !pqN)" \ = \ 13 and y qNqN  1 ¡\ + !pq1¢" \ = \ 13. (34)
However, by dividing both sides of the first equation by the corresponding sides
of the second, we see that they together imply:
1 ? 1 1@qN
1 1@q1
=
µ \ + !pq1b\ + !pqN
¶"µ\
\
¶23
?
µ\
\
¶23+"
.
Since we want \ to be smaller than \ , the two inequalities imply 2  + " A 0,
which is only possible, for " arbitrarily close to 0, if   2 (the condition which
entails dynamic determinacy).
Proof of Lemma 2
In state u = n, there are qn firms actually producing in any industry, and
the aggregate output \ (qn) (which, as Wn = hn, is expected to be realized in
next period with probability 1) is determined by equation (14), with J = K =
qn@ (qn  1) and qD = qn. For simplicity of notation, we will omit the subscript
n in the following. By condition (17), profitability requires:
q 
s
q\ (q)
(q 1)!p  n (q) . (35)
If the elasticity of n is smaller than 1 for q  2, the equation q = n (q) uniquely
determines the least upper bound q for an admissible q. Similarly, sustainability
requires by equation (18):
q  n (q)
2 1@n (q)  n (q) . (36)
Again, if the elasticity of n is smaller than 1 for q  2, the equation q = n (q)
uniquely determines the greatest lower bound q for an admissible q. The elastic-
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ities of n and n are:
n (q) = 1
2
µ
\ (q) 1q 1
¶
(37)
n (q) = 2n (q) n (q) 1
2n (q) 1 . (38)
The inequality n (q) ? 1 is implied by the inequality n (q) ? 1: hence, both
inelasticities are smaller than 1 if \ (q) ? 1@ (q 1)+ 2. The elasticity of \ (q),
by equation (14), is:
\ (q) = 1q 1
\ (q) @!p ((q 1)" 1)q
( + ")\ (q) @!p+ q . (39)
It can be easily checked that 3+"  1 is a su!cient condition for this elasticity
to be smaller than 1@ (q 1) + 2 when q  2.
Proof of Proposition 3
By Lemma 1, we know that there exists a solution (\1> ===> \U) to the system
(15). For this solution to be an equilibrium, we must show that profitability
(qn  qu, by (17)) and sustainability (qn  qu, by (18)) are ensured for any
n = 1> ===>N and any u = 1> ===> U. In order to do that, let us find \inf and \sup
such that
\inf  min {\1> ===> \U}  max {\1> ===> \U}  \sup, (40)
and such that, for any n,q
qinf
qinf31
\sup
!p
2 1@
q
qinf
qinf31
\sup
!p
= qinf  qn  qsup =
s
qsup
qsup  1
\inf
!p . (41)
Clearly, if such pair (\inf > \sup) exists, qsup  qu and qinf  qu for any u, so that
(\1> ===> \U) is indeed an equilibrium. Moreover, we want the choice of (\inf > \sup),
and hence that of the interval [qinf > qsup], to be made independently of the specific
family of states (I1> ===> IU) and of the specific transition probabilities (W1> ===> WU).
So, take the u-th equation of the system (15), with the means Ju , Ku and
qDu expressed as functions of (q1u> ===> qpu). The elasticity of its LHS, denoted
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K (\u> q1u> ===> qpu), with respect to qlu is
lK (\u> q1u> ===> qpu) = "
¡
Ju @Ku
¢
\u
¡
lJu  lKu
¢
+ !qlu
(Ju @Ku )\u + !pqDu
+ lJu (42)
=
1
pqlu
Ã
"
¡
Ju @Ku
¢
\u
¡
Ku  lu
¢
+ !pqDu
¡
qlu@qDu
¢
qlu
(Ju @Ku )\u + !pqDu
 lu
!
.
As lu = qlu@ (qlu  1) is decreasing in qlu and as the eects of a change of qlu on
the markup means are dominated (at least for large p) by its direct eects on lu,
the expression inside the parentheses is increasing in qlu, so that K is a strictly
quasi-convex function of qlu.
If K is an increasing function of qlu, the maximum (resp. the minimum) of K
over [qinf > qsup], given \u, is obtained when qlu = qsup (resp. qlu = qinf) for any l.
Then, if  ? 1, we can determine \inf and \sup from (15):
y qsupqsup  1
(\inf + !pqsup)" \inf = \ 13inf 
UX
u0=1
Wuu0\ 13u0  \ 13sup (43)
and
y qinfqinf  1
(\sup + !pqinf)" \sup = \ 13sup 
UX
u0=1
Wuu0\ 13u0  \ 13inf . (44)
These two equations, which would apply to a deterministic symmetric equilibrium
so that \inf = \ (qsup) and \sup = \ (qinf). By (41) and according to the proof of
Lemma 2, qinf = q and qsup = q, so that [qinf > qsup] = [q> q]. Also, again by (41),
\sup@!p = \ (q) @!p = (q 1)
³
1 +
p
1 1@q
´
. By (42), lK (\ (q) > q> ===> q) 
0 if "  [ (q), so that K is indeed increasing in qlu as assumed and also, by (39),
\ is a decreasing function, as it should for having \ (q)  \ (q).
If  A 1, the two equations (43) and (44) must be replaced by the equations:
y qsupqsup  1
(\inf + !pqsup)" \inf = \ 13sup 
UX
u0=1
Wuu0\ 13u0  \ 13inf (45)
and
y qinfqinf  1
(\sup + !pqinf)" \sup = \ 13inf 
UX
u0=1
Wuu0\ 13u0  \ 13sup . (46)
Hence, \inf  \ (qsup) and \sup  \ (qinf), and also qinf  q and qsup  q, so that
we obtain [qinf > qsup]  [q> q]. The condition for K to be an increasing function
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of qlu is now "  [ (qinf) but, since [ is a decreasing function, it is satisfied if
"  [ (q).
Let us now consider the case where K is a decreasing function of qlu. The
argument is similar. If  ? 1, \inf = \ (qinf) and \sup = \ (qsup) by (43) and
(44) with qsup and qinf interchanged. Also, qinf  q and qsup  q by (41), hence
[qinf > qsup]  [q> q]. By (41) and (42), lK (\ (qsup) > qsup> ===> qsup)  0, so that
K is indeed a decreasing function of qlu as assumed, if "  [ (qsup), a weaker
condition than "  [ (q). The same condition on " entails by (39) that \ is
increasing, so that \ (qinf) ? \ (qsup). Finally, if  A 1, we obtain by the same
kind of argument: \inf  \ (qinf)  \ (qsup)  \sup, qinf  q and qsup  q, hence
[qinf > qsup]  [q> q], with the same condition on ".
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